You’ve Made Your Bed, Now Go Lie in It: Court May Not Consider the Preclusive Effect Of Its Own Decision

If a Court were to also make a finding of fact in its Order sustaining a claim objection “...creditor has also manipulated the books and records,” can the creditor ask the Court to amend its order out of fear that such language in an Order would have a potential preclusive effect in another court?

Absolutely not!

As the Supreme Court has twice ruled within the last six years, “the first court does not get to dictate the preclusive consequences of its own judgment.”  Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1361 (2008).

As Judge Jaraslovsky told a party seeking to have the court’s order amended for fear of its preclusive effect, “I’ve rendered my decision.  I gave my reasons.  And if another court decides that they want to give preclusive effect, that’s for another court to decide.”

To Sign or Not Sign The Allonge

If a bank obtains a Note, but the Note contains an endorsement in blank on its face — can the bank seek to enforce the the lien associated with the Note against a residence?

Yep.

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1935 Quote by Prof. Roger Foster Analogizing The Relationship of the Supreme Court & the Bankruptcy Community to Greek Gods and Mere Mortals

I found Prof. Foster’s analogy, from Dan Bussel’s commentary, quite interesting in analogizing the relationship of the Supreme Court and the bankruptcy community to that of the Greek gods and mere mortals.

“The decisions of the Supreme Court may fall like thunderbolts from Almighty Jove. There is a blinding flash, perhaps some spectacular damage to a restricted area. Temporarily there is terror and repentance. But soon calm is restored and with it confidence that, granted a proper observance of prescribed rituals and occasional adaptation of their form to the whims of an angry god, there is likely to be very little interference with the actual plans of those who walk the earth below.”

Think of Stern v. Marshall and Wellness.

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Watching 9th Circuit En Banc Argument – Schwartz-Tallard

I went to San Francisco this week to watch the en banc oral argument in the Schwartz-Tallard case.  Eleven judges on a cutting edge issue in bankruptcy!!  I wondered if I would be able to get in.  Five minutes before the judges came out, I was one of four people in the crowd.  About then, ten or so young lawyer looking people came in to watch.  I learned later that it was the judges clerks.

Schwartz-Tallard deals with Section 362(k) which provides that “an individual injured by any willful violation of a stay provided by this section shall recover actual damages, including costs and attorneys’ fees, and, in appropriate circumstances, may recover punitive damages.”

To cut to the chase, I think it will be an overwhelming affirmation of the BAP ruling that the debtor gets her attorney’s fees for participating in the creditor’s appeal.  The real question that the judges asked a few times is what they should do about Sternberg v. Johnson.  Judge O’Scannlain commented, “Collier’s has not been kind to our opinion in Sternberg.”  A couple judges specifically asked, “What do you think we should do about Sternberg?”  Do we have to get to Sternberg to resolve what you want?  The answer of course was yes on one side and no on the other.

The argument began with the judges jumping all over the creditor’s attorney about the plain language of 362(k)!  They were not interested in cites to old cases discussing “fee splitting.”  If the language Congress gave us is clear, the inquiry stops there.  At least 6 or 8 seemed to think the language was completely clear, the debtor gets attorney’s fees when the stay is violated.  I was thinking this is going to be 11-0!   When the attorney would make an argument, a judge would respond “but we have the language right in front of us.”  Inevitably he – she would add, “let me read it to you again.”

When the debtor’s turn came, the questions were more about where does this stop?  What if you have scorched earth litigation?  The debtor’s attorney actually made a huge gaff with that.  There was some discussion about some section somewhere that says “reasonable attorneys fees” but 362(k) only says attorneys fees.  A judge asked, “Are you suggesting that we must award whatever the fees are and cannot look to reasonableness?”  Judge Hurwitz then jumped in laughing and saying, “What if the attorney is charging $10,000 a minute!”  “Are you saying the code requires that to be paid without any review?”  The attorney, clearly the deer in the headlights at that point, paused – you could see him panicking inside – “Yes.”  That brought open disdain and smirks all around.”  Several jumped on him about that.  One gently asked a question adding, “That is a softball question.  I’m helping you.”

The attorney representing NACBA then got up and did a great job.  He said obviously the fees have to be reasonable.  When asked, he said the fees could be nothing depending on the facts although that would be unusual.

The lesson I cam away with is the judges are human.  They don’t know anything about bankruptcy.  They want to do what’s right and that is enforce the law that Congress wrote.  The lawyers were determined to cite 50 cases and other code sections and predict the failure of the world if their point of view is not written into law.  They talked very little about bankruptcy.  They had too many notebooks, way too many prepared speeches that they kept trying to get back to.  One talked so fast you could barely understand him.  Of course, all that is easy to say sitting in the gallery.

In fairness, with 8 or 9 judges trying to ask you questions, the whole thing is very disjointed.   And I walked away wondering why it is so hard for lawyers to directly answer the questions.  That seems to almost never happen.  I suspect it’s because of the fear that you won’t be given a chance to explain the yes or no that they want.  That is actually fair.  I’m going to point that out to the next appellate judge I happen to be near and try to get some sense of their view.

How to Recover Attorney’s Fees in Preference Action

Defending against a preference action is challenging, especially more so when your client is an innocent bystander to such a draconian rule.   Unfortunately too, recovering attorney’s fees from a successful defense is not in your favor either.

Attorney’s fees are generally not recoverable for successfully defending against the trustee’s preference action because a preference action is based wholly in bankruptcy law, is unique to bankruptcy and not an action under contract law (which gives effect to attorney’s fees clause in contract).   Alvarado v. Walsh (In re LCO Enters., Inc.), 180 B.R. 567, 570-71 (9th Cir. BAP 1995), aff’d, 105 F.3d 665 (9th Cir. 1997).

Attorneys CAN recover fees in defending a preference action IF:  (cue suspense music)

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Chapter 11 Debtors Are Prohibited From Paying Taxes… Without a Notice and Hearing!

Before people worry too much, this is not as bad as it sounds but it is still pretty awful.

Under Bankruptcy Code section 102, “notice and hearing” is a due process safeguard: “after such notice as is appropriate in the particular circumstances, and such opportunity for a hearing as is appropriate in the particular circumstances.” In other words, there are circumstances where notice and hearing means just notice or notice and an opportunity to object. Hopefully local bankruptcy rules are modified to make these notice only requests.

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June 18, 2015 – SFVBA – Settling with the Trustee

San Fernando Valley Bar Association – Bankruptcy Law Section
Settling with the Trustee

Panel: Stella Havkin; Michael Kogan; Wes Avery

Current and former Chapter 7 trustees and counsel discuss the do’s and don’ts of making deals in bankruptcies with Chapter 7 trustees.

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Bankruptcy Works!

My wife wanted to go shopping at the Burbank Mall yesterday. I told her to have fun but that did not work.

After we worked up an appetite, we headed to the food court. While she ordered food, I headed over to Hot Dogs on a Stick. There was a moderate line, good. I was given a free hush puppy to try and when I inquired about their ice drinks, I was given a nice size sample. Delicious.

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An entertaining footnote about metaphors!

This is footnote 2 from Official Committee v. Integrated Res., Inc. (In re Integrated Res., Inc.), 147 B.R. 650, 662 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1992):

The Supreme Court has warned that “[c]atch words and labels . . . are subject to the dangers that lurk in metaphors and symbols, and must be watched with circumspection lest they put us off guard.”United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 253, 109 S.Ct. 1026, 1036, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989) (citing Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 586, 57 S.Ct. 524, 528, 81 L.Ed. 814 (1937)). Nevertheless, courts seem to enjoy framing bankruptcy issues in colorful, but misleading, metaphor. For example, the term “stalking horse” has appeared in a variety of odd contexts. See, e.g.,In re El Paso Pharm., Inc., 130 B.R. 492, 496 (Bankr.W.D.Tex. 1991) (“[t]he jury issue thus turns out to be a stalking horse”); In re Louis Fleet, 122 B.R. 910, 917 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1990) (rejecting a “last ditch effort” of a debtor to use “his wife as a stalking horse”).

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Bankruptcy Judges Might Not Be Able to Remand Removed Cases!

This is a dangerous article to write but I am hoping the comments will be worth it.

So the Wellness case came out and the Supreme Court seems to have taken a pragmatic view by allowing parties to consent (implied or explicit) to the jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts. Fine. But is there more to this story?

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