A thanks to Alan Wenokur in Seattle for this post on another list serve:

In In re Lawson, 156 B.R. 43 (9th Cir. BAP 1993), the BAP addressed a nearly identical fact pattern.  The debtor’s counsel, Mr. Tilem and Mr. Schwartz, withdrew from a bankruptcy case and then applied for compensation.  They were awarded final attorney’s fees. The bankruptcy case was then dismissed.  Former counsel petitioned the bankruptcy court to grant them formal judgments based on their fee awards. The bankruptcy court did so. The BAP, per Judge Volinn, affirmed. The court held that orders related to final fee awards are part of the bankruptcy court’s ancillary jurisdiction that is unaffected by the dismissal of the case:

Actions are said to be ancillary to the original suit when brought in aid of an execution or to effectuate a judgment entered in the prior suit. Jones v. Nat’l Bank of Commerce, 157 F.2d 214, 215 (8th Cir. 1946). Such an action is dependent upon a judgment or a decree in the original suit which is complete and determines the rights of the parties. Id. (citations omitted.) In the present case, the fee awards granted Tilem and Schwartz are final, and the present action therefore is ancillary in nature.  In re Lawson, supra, 156 B.R. at 46.

Critically, the BAP noted that final fee awards are judgments under the Bankruptcy Rules: “Both the Tilem and Schwartz fee awards are final judgments as defined in Bankruptcy Rules 9001(7) (‘Judgment’ means any appealable order) and 9002(5) (‘Judgment’ includes any order appealable to an appellate court).” Id.  See, also, In re Yermakov, 718 F.2d 1465, 1469 (9th Cir. 1983) (fee award under § 330 constitutes a final judgment, order or decree.) Read more…

A footnote in some case I was reading.

2 The Court takes judicial notice of its files and records under Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See In re Clark, 525 B.R. 442, 449 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2015), aff’d, 2016 WL 1377807 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. March 29, 2016) (taking judicial notice of papers filed on its docket and noting, “Papers filed in a bankruptcy case by a debtor under penalty of perjury also have evidentiary significance under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)”).

Another thing I want to remember.  Where does it say that BAP cases aren’t binding on bankruptcy judges?  This is footnote in the new BAP case of Leavitt v. Black  (In re Black), — B.R. —  (9th Cir. BAP  Dec, 2019).

Mr. Black argues that Burgie is binding on all bankruptcy courts in the circuit and that the bankruptcy court erred by failing to follow it.  The Ninth Circuit has never held that our decisions are binding (under stare decisis principles) on any court. See, e.g., Bank of Maui v. Estate Analysis, Inc., 904 F.2d 470, 472 (9th Cir. 1990).  We view ourselves as bound by our prior published decisions. Salomon N. Am. v. Knupfer (In re Wind N’ Wave), 328 B.R. 176, 181 (9th Cir. BAP 2005) (“[W]e regard ourselves as bound by our prior decisions, and ‘will not overrule our prior rulings unless a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision, Supreme Court decision or subsequent legislation has undermined those rulings.’” (citations omitted)); 9th Cir. BAP R. 8024-1(c)(1) (also acknowledging ability of Panel to modify or reverse itself sitting en banc). We will follow Burgie, and we need not decide whether stare decisis also obliged the bankruptcy court to do so.