All posts in Chapter 7

San Diego Chapter 7 RARA – I like it

I will probably get pitched out of the consumer bar for saying this but I like the San Diego Chapter 7 RARA.  You can access the form here.  The form would make a nice retainer agreement.  Most of the body of the form is below. Read more…

Judge Scott Clarkson Refers Matter to Office of the Inspector General and Executive Office of the US Trustee

Judge Scott Clarkson has entered an Order entitled (in part)  ORDER (1) REFERRING MATTER TO (a) THE OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND (b) THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRUSTEE in the matter of In re Cherrett, Case No. 6:13-bk-24792-SC.  The Order states (in part) as follows:

“In the end, the process of administration of this estate, and the delay of consideration of closing of this estate by the Court, may have been improperly inhibited.  It was not the role of the U.S. Trustee, which is not a party to the appeal, to provide a de facto stay pending appeal.  By its affirmative actions, the U.S. Trustee may have intentionally favored one party to the possible detriment of another party, which if true, this Court finds unjustified and offensive.

Based upon the record as a whole and for the reasons set forth on the record,

IT IS ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:

1. The Court hereby refers this matter to the Office of the Inspector General for the Department of Justice (“OIG”) for the purpose of investigating any and all matters discussed at length during the September 13, 2016 hearing and as set forth in the Court’s Order. This referral includes a request that the OIG investigate and determine whether the U.S. Trustee behaved improperly or engaged in any impropriety with respect to the U.S. Trustee’s influence with the Chapter 7 Trustee resulting in the withdrawal of the Trustee’s Final Report. The Court refers this matter to the OIG for any appropriate actions, as deemed appropriate by the OIG after a full review. The Court further refers this matter to the Executive Office of the United States Trustee for whatever internal actions it may desire to take.
2. The bankruptcy court shall request and pay for a hearing transcript of the September 13, 2016 hearing, which is to be prepared on a non-expedited basis.

Download Clarkson’s Cherrett Order

Renewal of Judgment Requires Recording of Application for Renewal for Survival of Judgment Lien – Pete Steinberg

From Pete Steinberg:

As you may be aware from my prior emails, my firm and I handle Plaintiff litigation arising from bankruptcy malpractice, and, like you, I am also on the Bankruptcy Mediation Panel. Read more…

Husky v. Ritz – the Supreme Court Really Needs Some Bankruptcy Basics

I get calls all the time from people who say that so and so owes them money and just filed bankruptcy.  I ask, “Did the debtor lie and cheat and steal when you loaned him the money or sold him the goods?”  No – well then I would take your files and pitch them in the ocean.  You are out of luck.  The debtor gets his fresh start.

Now I can say, “any chance the debtor hid some assets or transferred something he owned to some relative?”  If so, the Supreme Court says that MIGHT form the basis for declaring the debt to you to be non dischargeable.  If the debtor really did that I usually tell the client, we can ask the court to deny his discharge altogether under section 727 but then you are in line with all other creditors whose debts are likewise not discharged.  But now we can go after the debtor alone under 523(a)(2) and have the debt discharged only as to us, not everyone else.    The Supreme Court really had no idea of this.   Read more…

I Love the Writing Style of 9th Circuit Judge John Owens

Pretty fun reading (and thankfully the right result).

Sheer v. State Bar of California (In re Sheer), — F. 3d, —- (9th Cir. April, 2016)

Issue: Was a state bar judgment requiring the debtor to repay fees to a client a non-dischargeable debt under 523(a)(7)?
Holding: No. The debt “is not a fine or penalty, but compensation for actual loss.” Read more…

Penrod Giveth and Bos Taketh Away – A Response from Peter Lively

My sense is that Judge Watford should have referred to the creditor’s objection to Penrod’s 506b motion rather than its objection to her Plan’s confirmation.

By challenging the bankruptcy code’s ability to modify the vehicle loan, although if you don’t have car you can use Flex Fleet Rental services to rent cars to drive around you might want to check their website and find more information clasiq.com, the creditor was litigating enforceability of its contract as falling outside the scope of the code rather than acknowledge that it’s contact was subject to the code and fighting over how the code functions – like the more general modification of contract rights that are the focus of plan confirmation, relief from stay and such.

If you take Judge Watford’s premise that the contract rights were at play because of the creditor’s plan confirmation objection, then the only way to reconcile Bos and David’s RFS opinion is to view everything through the OJ Dream Team lense where the highest priced legal team prevail in court.

Best regards,
Peter

Penrod Giveth and Bos Taketh Away

I thought I knew where we are on attorneys fees after the 9th Circuit ruled in In re Penrod that a creditor fighting with a debtor in a bankruptcy case, is an effort by the creditor to collect its debt form the debtor, and therefore an “action on the contract” and therefore, assuming there is a right to attorneys fees in the contract, the bankruptcy court can award attorneys fees to the debtor.

My friend Peter Lively was surprised to hear me say recently that I think that Penrod allows for attorneys fees to the debtor anytime the debtor defeats any creditor efforts in a bankruptcy case including stay relief motions, oppositions to plan confirmation, battles over property values, cash collateral, plan fights.  His sense was that since Penrod was over the issue of bifurcating a car loan, it didn’t necessarily extend out to everything else.  He promised to look into it further.

In Penrod Judge Watford wrote:

“Under California law, an action is ‘on a contract’ when a party seeks to enforce, or avoid enforcement of, the provisions of the contract.  AmeriCredit sought to enforce the provisions of its contract with Penrod when it objected to confirmation of her proposed Chapter 13 plan.”

“AmeriCredit insisted that it was entitled to have its claim treated as fully secured.  The only possible source of that asserted right was the contract—in particular, the provision in which Penrod granted a security interest in her Taurus to secure ‘payment of all you owe on this contract.’” Read more…

Current Monthly Income When Only One Spouse Files

I have been working on the third edition of my Summary of Bankruptcy Law.  I hope to have it finished this summer.  I noticed a statement I made in the second edition that when a spouse files without the other spouse, the debtor’s current monthly income or CMI is the CMI of both spouses.  I started wondering where it says that and whether that’s even right.  I asked a few friends to comment and of course the simple question became complex although I think, thanks to a couple friends, we at least can give you a straight answer. Read more…

The Statute of Limitations Defense in Non-Dischargeability Actions

It has always been obvious that if there is a statute of limitations defense outside of bankruptcy, it files inside.  By why?  I have wondered that when asked the question over the years.  Recently I happened to stumble across section 558 which states:

The estate shall have the benefit of any defense available to the debtor as against any entity other than the estate, including statutes of limitation, statutes of frauds, usury, and other personal defenses.  A waiver of any such defense by the debtor after the commencement of the case does not bind the estate.

Been there since 1984.  But what does that apply to? – seems to be the estate only. Read more…

Quick Blurb About Section 109(g)

Under 109(g), an individual (or family farmer) may not be a debtor if “(2) the debtor requested and obtained the voluntary dismissal of the case following the filing of a request for relief from the automatic stay provided by section 362 of this title

I tell my clients that if we move to voluntarily dismiss a case after a relief from stay motion is filed, there will be a 180 day bar to refiling. Something in my brain changed the word from “following” to “after.” It turns out that they do not mean the same thing. Read more…