How Does the Sham Guarantor Defense Work?

Under California law, a lender may not pursue a deficiency judgment against a borrower where the sale of property securing a debt produces proceeds insufficient to cover the amount of the debt. Lenders may pursue deficiency judgments against guarantors, but only true guarantors. Where the borrower and the guarantor are the same, however, the guaranty is considered an unenforceable sham.

The first set of antideficiency laws were enacted during the Great Depression. They prohibited lenders from obtaining personal judgments against borrowers where the lender’s sale of real property security produces proceeds insufficient to cover the amount of the debt. These laws were expanded beginning on January 1, 2013 in response to the bursting of the housing market bubble.

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Secured Creditors Who Do Not File Continuation Statements Will Lose Their Secured Status, Despite a Bankruptcy

UCC-1 financing statements are effective for five years.  Before the five years has run, the creditor must renew the financing statement by filing what’s called a continuation statement.  This is essentially a UCC-1 with a check next to the box labeled “continuation statement.”  The only caveat is any continuation statement must be filed no sooner than six months before the five year period has expired.  Assuming a continuation statement is filed, the five year period is expanded by five years from when the original would have expired.  This can be done indefinitely.

What if the Debtor filed bankruptcy?

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Origin of “…the Honest but Unfortunate Debtor”

If you have been wondering about the the origin of the phrase….”…the honest but unfortunate debtor…”, below should provide the roadmap.

National Assn of Chap 13 Trustees Annual Meeting is July 1-4, 2015 in Salt Lake City

You can access the NACTT brochure here.

Preemption and the Supremacy Clause

Twice in the last week I have had an attorney ask me a bankruptcy question and then comment that it seems to him that the answer is in the supremacy clause.  In other words, the federal law is bigger and better and more important and more powerful than state law so it wins.  This shows a lack of understanding of preemption and the supremacy clause.

It is constitutional law 101 that the federal government has the power to do only what the constitution gives it the power to do.  Everything else is reserved to the states.  Further, the states can do anything they want unless the constitution says they cannot or the federal government has passed a law, using a power given to it in the constitution, which is intended to preempt the field.  How do we know when congress “intended” to preempt the field?  When it says so right in the legislation or when the law it passed is so comprehensive that it leaves nothing left for the states to do.

In Sturges v. Crowninshield,  17 U.S. 122 (1819), the Supreme Court, Chief Justice John Marshall, ruled that states can pass bankruptcy laws!  At least until congress passes a law which it intends to preempt the field.  States cannot however grant a discharge of debts since the constitution says states cannot “impair the obligations of contracts.”

Most states including California have assignment for the benefit of creditors laws (“ABC”) which function very similar to bankruptcy laws.  Someone liquidates the assets for the debtor and distributes the proceeds to the creditors.   So obviously the bankruptcy act we have today, Title 11, is not a law which has preempted the field, at least completely.

States cannot however pass laws which “unreasonably” interfere with federal laws.  A state cannot pass a law for example that provides that persons who file bankruptcy must nevertheless pay their attorneys the amount owed prior to bankruptcy.  That would, in effect, amend the bankruptcy code.  Congress has decided who gets a discharge and for what.  States cannot interfere with that decision.  Congress could amend the code and say that each state can decide what debts will be discharged as it has done with exemptions.  But it has not so states must steer clear.  Why?  Because of the supremacy clause.

Two examples of this come to mind.  In Local Loan Co. v. Hunt,  292 U.S. 234 (1934), Illinois law provided that a lien could attach to future wages and we all know liens don’t go away in bankruptcy.  The Supreme Court struck down the law saying, “The … Illinois [law] is ‘precluded here by the clear and unmistakable policy of the Bankruptcy Act.’”   The effect of the law was to prevent discharges that congress intended to include.

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cdcbaa Newsletter – Nice Article on Judge Catherine Bauer

The latest cdcbaa Newsletter is out.  You can access it here.  There is a great article on Judge Catherine Bauer and some nice tributes to Jim King.

California One-Action Rule Preempted by Federal Debt Collection Improvement Act

Cal. Code Civ. P. § 726, often referred to as the one-action rule, has many facets. Relevant to this article is the “security-first” rule which requires “a secured creditor to proceed against the security before enforcing the underlying debt”; the penalty for failing to do so is waiver of the security.

In practical terms, this means a creditor secured by property has to either pursue foreclosure or file a lawsuit on the debt. The aforementioned ‘or’ is an exclusive ‘or’ meaning the lender has to pick one or the other and cannot pick both options. Consequently, this is what’s typically referred to as an “election of remedies.” Read more…

Nice Discussion of Critical Vendor Motions from Chief Judge Sheri Bluebond

Tentative Ruling today from Chief Judge Sheri Bluebond.  I do not know how she ultimately ruled but you can see the thought process very nicely.

2:15-17527 Redondo Brothers, Inc. Chapter 11

#106.00 Debtors Emergency First Day Motion For An Order Authorizing Debtor To Pay Pre-Petition Claims Of Certain Critical Vendors Necessary For Its Continued Operations

There is no basis upon which the Court can or should authorize the payment of prepetition claims.  The concept of a critical vendor is a very narrow one that should only be applied when there is no permissible theory under which the requested amounts can be paid and it is clear that, by using property of the estate in this manner, the value of the estate is increased by more than the amount of cash that must be spent to make the payment.  The debtor has not made a sufficient record to support such payments here.  The motion reflects a debtor who did not want to bother taking the time or effort to analyze whether there are other bases upon which payments can or should be made.

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Proposed Changes to the California Homestead Exemption

SB 308 is a new bill introduced by Senator Bob Wieckowski in the California State Senate that provides significant improvements to California’s current exemptions including:

  • increasing the homestead to $300,000 for all individuals;
  • removing the 6 month reinvestment requirement;
  • increasing the exemption for vehicles to $6,000;
  • establishing that bankruptcy alone is not an event of default; and
  • creating a grubstake of $5,000 for self-employed individuals.

The complete text of the amendment can be found here.

Note: the link above is to the original proposal and is easy to read. The original proposal provided for a $700,000 exemption which was amended down to $300,000. A more difficult to read, updated version can be found here.

Nice Tentative by Chief Judge Sheri Bluebond on Rejecting a Family Law Contract

United States Bankruptcy Court
Central District of California
Chief Judge Sheri Bluebond, Presiding

Wednesday, May 20, 2015 Hearing Room 1475

2:15-11273 [debtor] Chapter 11
#7.00 Motion for an Order Rejecting Family Law Contract

The parties’ marital settlement agreement IS an executory contract.  The issue is whether there are unperformed obligations remaining on both sides of the contract that are sufficiently material that, if either party failed to perform these obligations, it would constitute a breach of the contract, relieving the other party of a duty of further performance.  Counsel for [the debtor] claims that [her] only remaining obligations are ministerial and therefore do not count.  This is not true.  Cooperating with transfers of title of real property is not merely a ministerial act in this context.  Refusing to cooperate in transfers of title would constitute a material breach of the contract.  The fact that the debtor would be able to compel performance and, if necessary, have a court official execute deeds on her behalf does not mean that these are not material obligations.  But there are other ongoing obligations as well that have been held sufficient to cause a given contract to be treated as executory, including the parties’ obligations to indemnify each other and hold each other harmless from and against certain obligations, the obligations with regard the payment of tax liabilities and expenses, and the like. Find more details about family laws practice here.

[The debtor] has cited to a handful of cases in which various obligations were treated as not being sufficient to make a given contract executory.  A careful review of executory contracts cases would reveal that the identical obligation has been held sufficient to cause a contract to be characterized as executory in one instance and to be insufficient in another.  This is because courts, adopting an outcome-oriented approach, have either attempted to avoid adverse results or to create desired benefits for one party or the other by manipulating the definition of executoriness.  This court rejects that approach.  Properly understood, rejection does not result in avoidance of the contract. It merely constitutes a thorough breach of the contract that is deemed to have occurred immediately prior to the petition date.  For an extensive, scholarly discussion of these issues, see M. Andrews, “Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Understanding ‘Rejection,'” 59 U. Colo. L. Rev. 845 (1985).

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